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GIan PIetro SolIanI
Duns Scotus on the First Object of the Human Intellect. 
From the ens univocum to the ens possibile*
this article will discuss John Duns Scotus’s doctrine about being (ens) as the 
first object of the intellect. This well-known doctrine has undergone an evolution 
from the Ordinatio to the Quaestiones quodlibetales1. However, this evolution is not 
a radical change, but only a development of the doctrine that Scotus elaborates 
in Ordinatio, I, d. 3 and d. 8. This development provides Scotus’s position with 
greater coherence and represents, to a certain extent, a departure from Avicenna’s 
thought. While in the Ordinatio Scotus refers to the first object of the human 
intellect as common to every possible first intention or real being (ens reale), like 
God and creature, substance and accident, in the Quaestiones quodlibetales he 
holds that the first and most adequate object of the intellect also includes every 
second intention or being of reason (ens rationis), such as species, genus and the 
like. According to Scotus, second intentions are the subject-matter of logic, so 
they are not investigated in metaphysics. The metaphysician only deals with first 
intentions. However, both first and second intentions belong to the domain of 
being and represent different points of view about being2. First intentions refer to 
* I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their useful suggestions and comments. Faults, 
of course, are mine and mine alone.
1 This evolution had been noted by D. Demange, Jean Duns Scot. La théorie du savoir, Vrin, Paris 
2007, ch. 9. On this evolution, see also g. P. Soliani, Rosmini e Duns Scoto. Le fonti scotiste dell’ontologia 
rosminiana, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2012, Part I. For an introduction to Scotus’s doctrine of being and its 
relation with the human intellect, see L. HonnefelDer, Ens in quantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden 
als Solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehere des Johannes Duns Scotus, Aschendorff, 
Münster 1979 ; iD., Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der 
wiederbergründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert, in J. P. Beckmann et al. eds., Philosophie 
im Mittelalter : Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, Meiner, Hamburg 1987, pp. 165-186 ; iD., Scientia 
transcendens : die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und 
der Neuzeit : Duns Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, Kant, Peirce, Meiner, Hamburg 1990, pp. 3-199 ; O. BoulnoiS, 
Être et representation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe - XIVe 
siècle), PUF, Paris 20082 ; t. B. noone, Scotus on Mind and Being. Transcendental and Developmental 
Psychology, « Acta Philosophica », 18, 2009, pp. 249-282 ; J. A. aertSen, Medieval Philosophy as a 
Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez, Brill, Leiden 2013.
2 Cf. e.g. ioanneS DunS ScotuS, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (= Quaest. 
super Met.), VI, q. 3, edd. g. i. etzkorn et al., in ioanniS DunS Scoti Opera Philosophica, vols. III-
IV,  The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1997 (= OPh III and IV), p. 83, n. 71 : « omnes 
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a thing’s essence regardless of the relation it bears to the intellect, while second 
intentions refer to a thing’s essence as thought by the intellect3. 
The present article is divided into two parts. In the first part, after summarizing 
Scotus’s position on being as elaborated in the Ordinatio and in some places of the 
Quaestiones in Metaphysicam4, we shall discuss the ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions of this position, and in particular those features of Scotus’s 
understanding of being that will help us to appreciate the development of his 
position. Interpreters of Scotus have often assumed that the subject-matter of 
metaphysics coincides with the first and most adequate object of the intellect. But 
the development of Scotus’s position about the first object of the intellect is a clear 
proof of the difference between being as the first object of the intellect and being 
as the subject-matter of metaphysics. The problem of the first and most adequate 
object of the intellect concerns the power and extension of our understanding, 
while the metaphysics, insofar as it is the science of real being, is not the science 
of being in its greatest extension. If we consider the four meanings of being (to; o]n) 
given by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, V and VI — absolute being divided into the 
ten categories ; accidental being ; being as true and false ; being as potency and 
act5 —, as we shall see, Scotus limits the subject-matter of metaphysics to the 
first meaning, i.e. to the absolute being divided into the ten categories.
In the second part, we shall illustrate the development of Scotus’s doctrine of the 
first object of the intellect. Significant for this purpose is a text from the Reportata 
intentiones secundae […] proprie excluduntur a metaphysico. Convertitur tamen cum ente aliqualiter, 
quia logicus considerat omnia aliqualiter ut metaphysicus, sed modus alius considerationis, scilicet 
per quid reale, et per intentionem secundam, sicut convertibilitas entis simpliciter et deminuti, quia 
neutrum alterum excedit in communitate. Quidquid est simpliciter ens, potest esse ens deminutum ». 
See also Quaestiones super Librum Elenchorum Aristotelis, q. 1, edd. R. anDrewS et al., in ioanniS 
DunS Scoti Opera Philosophica, vol. II, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 2004, p. 272, 
n. 5 : « Ens est duplex scilicet naturae et rationis. Ens autem naturae, in quantum tale, est cuius esse 
non dependet ab anima. Sed ens rationis dicitur de quibusdam intentionibus quas adinvenit ratio in 
ipsis rebus, cuiusmodi sunt genus, species, definitio et huiusmodi. Ens autem dictum isto secundo 
modo aequiparatur secundum communitatem enti dicto priori modo. Non enim est aliquod ens 
naturae quin possit cadere sub ente rationis, et quin super ipsum fundari possit aliqua intentio, ut 
generis vel speciei vel proprii vel individui vel saltem causae vel causati. Quia ergo logica dicitur ex 
communibus procedere ».
3 On Scotus’s doctrine of first and second intentions, see g. Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns 
Scotus. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century, Brill, Leiden 2002, ch. 4.
4 Scotus probably commented on Aristotle’s Metaphysics many times across his career. On this, 
see g. Pini, Scoto e l’analogia. Logica e metafisica nei commenti aristotelici, Scuola Normale Superiore, 
Pisa 2002, pp. 16-22. In particular, on dating the Questions on the Metaphysics, see also Introduction 
to Quaest. super Met., OPh III, pp. xlii-xlvi ; S. P. marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance. Science 
and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century, Brill, Leiden - Boston - Köln 2001, vol. II, p. 400.
5 Cf. Met., V, 7, 1017a7-b26 ; VI, 2, 1026a35-1027a35.
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Parisiensia, a text that casts doubts on the coherence of the transition from the 
Ordinatio to the Quaestiones quodlibetales. Despite this development, Scotus never 
changed the basics of his doctrine about the relation between being and intellect, 
confining himself to shaping such a doctrine in a more coherent way. According 
to the Prologue of the Ordinatio, being is not only the first object of the human 
intellect, but also the first object of the habit of science (scientia). In the Ordinatio, 
Scotus holds that the first and most adequate object of the human intellect is 
being as common to first intentions. This conception of being seems to imply the 
exclusion of logic from the field of science in general, which cannot be said. This 
difficulty is probably the reason that led Scotus to modify his initial position. In 
the Quaestiones quodlibetales, Scotus finally holds that the first and most adequate 
object of the intellect is being as common both to first and second intentions. This 
conclusion appears more coherent with Scotus’s epistemological theory.
More specifically, our interpretation is that, according to Scotus, the object of 
the human intellect is not the product of an abstractive process6. In Scotus’s works 
we can distinguish an ontological meaning of the term ‘separated’ (abstractum) 
from a psychological one. According to the first meaning of abstraction, being has 
an ontological state of its own, which does not coincide with that of a particular 
being. Being considered in this sense — as we shall see — is the object of the 
intellect, although the intellect can discover it only by way of an act of psychological 
abstraction, namely by considering being as what is in common with every 
particular beings. With respect to this point, the relation existing among being, 
habit of science and memory calls for close consideration. According to Scotus, 
the first object of the intellect is present in human memory as an intelligible 
species7, but is not a product of the human intellect. In this sense, being can be 
called separated because it is in some way innate to us ; for this reason it can 
be said to be ontologically in common with every human intellect and also with 
the essence of every particular being. Being does not follow but precedes the act 
of understanding, so turning out to be a regulative principle of any cognitive 
operation. Only God can be considered the ontological fulfillment of being, but 
He can be seen by us only in the beatific vision.
6 Luigi Iammarrone seems to stress this same point when, with a Rosminian language, he talks of 
an « innatismo virtuale dell’idea dell’essere » (L. iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scoto. Metafisico e teologo. 
Le tematiche fondamentali della sua filosofia e teologia, Miscellanea francescana, Roma 1999, p. 34).
7 According to Scotus, the human intellect is provided with a memory which is able to contain the 
past knowledge, but also the intelligible species. Moreover, the intelligible species must precede the 
act of intellection because it is the representation of the object and the object must always precede the 
act of intellection. On this, see È. gilSon, Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à ses positions fondamentales, 
Vrin, Paris 1952, ch. 8.1 ; g. Pizzo, Intellectus und memoria nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, 
Verlag Butzon und Bereker, Kevelaer 1998 ; BoulnoiS, Être et representation, pp. 98-122 ; see also r. 
croSS, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, ch. 4.
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1. Some remarkS on Human intellect anD Being
1.1 Community and Virtuality of Being
According to Scotus, the human intellect turns to being in its full extension, 
including both God and every creature. This fact is mainly argued out of theological 
necessity : if the human intellect turned only to a portion of being and not to being 
as common to God and creatures, neither would the beatific vision be possible8, 
nor talking about God9. Even metaphysics as the science of being qua being would 
be impossible10. For this reason, the human intellect must extend de jure — but 
not de facto — its cognitive capacity towards God and immaterial substances11.
Being is common to and present in every essence. This is the reason why being 
is predicable essentially (in quid) of every essence. However, community is not 
enough to characterize being as the first object of the human intellect. In fact, being 
is not predicable essentially of the ultimate differentiae (differentiae ultimae) and 
of the proper passions of being (passiones entis), the transcendental properties, 
like one, good and true12. Scotus maintains that also virtuality is required, for it 
is what allows being to extend its domain also to the ultimate differentiae and 
the transcendental properties13. Note, however, that ‘virtuality’ does not mean 
8 Cf. e.g. ioanneS DunS ScotuS, Ordinatio (= Ord.), I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, in ioanniS DunS Scoti Opera 
omnia, vols. I-XIV, cura et studio Commissionis Scotisticae, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, Civitas 
Vaticana 1950-2013 (= ed. Vat. I-XIV), vol. III, p. 70, n. 113 : « intellectus, exsistens eadem potentia 
naturaliter, cognoscet per se quiditatem substantiae immaterialis, sicut patet secundum fidem de anima 
beata. Potentia autem manens eadem non potest habere actum circa aliquid quod non continetur 
sub suo primo obiecto » ; Lectura (= Lect.), I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, in ioanniS DunS Scoti Opera omnia, 
vols. XVI-XXI, cura et studio Commissionis Scotisticae, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, Civitas Vaticana 
1960-2004 (= ed. Vat. XVI-XXI), vol. XVI, p. 259, n. 92.
9 Cf. Lect., I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, ed. Vat. XVII, p. 234, n. 29 : « omnes magistri et theologi videntur uti 
conceptu communi Deo et creaturae, licet contradicant verbo quando applicant, nam in hoc conveniunt 
omnes quod accipiunt conceptus metaphysicales et removendo illud quod est imperfectionis in creaturis, 
attribuunt Deo quod est perfectionis, ut bonitatem, veritatem et sapientiam ». See also Reportata 
Parisiensia (= Rep. Par.), I, d. 3, q. 1, Vivès, Paris 1891-1895, vols. XXII-XXIII (= ed. Vivès XXII-XXIII), 
vol. XXII, p. 95, n. 7 : « Hoc etiam Magistri tractantes de Deo, et de his, quae cognoscuntur de Deo, 
observant univocationem entis in modo dicendi, licet voce hoc negent ».
10 Cf. e.g. Ord., I, d. 3, pars I, q. 3, ed. Vat. III, pp. 72-73, n. 117 ; Rep. Par., I, d. 3, q. 1, ed. Vivès 
XXII, p. 93, n. 3.
11 Cf. Ord., d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. III, p. 113, n. 186.
12 Ibid., p. 81, n. 131 : « dico quod ens non est univocum dictum in ‘quid’ de omnibus per se 
intelligibilibus, quia non de differentiis ultimis, nec de passionibus propriis entis ».
13 Ibid., p. 93, n. 150 : « in ente concurret duplex primitas, videlicet primitas communitatis in 
‘quid’ ad omnes conceptus non-simpliciter simplices, et primitas virtualitatis — in se vel in sui 
inferioribus — ad omnes conceptus simpliciter simplices. Et quod ista duplex primitas concurrens 
sufficiat ad hoc quod ipsum sit primum obiectum intellectus, licet neutram habeat praecise ad omnia 
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‘potentiality’. What is virtual has already an incipient actuality of being that is 
absent in what is simply potential. According to Scotus, thanks to its virtuality, 
being is able to contain and become all that is possible, both metaphysically and 
epistemologically. In fact, the object of the intellect’s domain includes everything 
that is intelligible (intelligibile or cognoscibile)14, and for this reason it includes 
God and whatever is created by Him. Being is also the first object of science, and 
as such it includes every other knowledge15. For all these reasons, Scotus affirms 
that being is the principle and the proper measure of knowledge16. 
1.2 The Relation between the Human Intellect and the First Object
More in particular, Scotus describes the relation between the human intellect 
and being as the relation of proportionality that holds between matter and form, 
potency and act, or mover and movable17. In order to understand this point and 
per se intelligibilia ». A doctrine that is alternative to this theory is present in the Questions on the 
Metaphysics. On this, see G. Pini, Univocity in Scotus’s Quaestiones super Metaphysicam. The Solution 
to a Riddle, « Medioevo », 30, 2005, pp. 69-110.
14 Cf. Quaest. super Met., II, qq. 2-3, OPh. III, p. 228, n. 94 : « nihil nisi ens est commune omni per 
se intelligibile, nisi forte alia convertibilia enti, ante quae omnia naturaliter prius est ens intelligibile, 
ut subiectum ante proprietates ».
15 Cf. Ord., prol., pars 3, qq. 1-3, art. 2, ed. Vat. I, pp. 96-97, nn. 142-143 : « ratio primi obiecti 
est continere in se primo virtualiter omnes veritates illius habitus. Quod probo sic : primo, quia 
obiectum primum continet propositiones immediatas, quia subiectum illarum continet praedicatum, 
et ita evidentiam propositionis totius ; propositiones autem immediate continent conclusiones ; 
ergo subiectum propositionum immediatarum continet omnes veritates illius habitus. Declaro idem 
secundo sic, quia primitas hic accipitur ex I Posteriorum, ex definitione universalis, secundum quod 
dicit adaequationem ; obiectum non esset adaequatum habitui nisi virtualiter contineret omnia illa 
ad quae consideranda habitus talis inclinat, quia si non, habitus excederet obiectum illud ».
16 Ibid., II, d. 3, pars 2, q. 3, ed. Vat. VII, p. 581, n. 370 : « Omnis autem ratio cognoscendi quae 
est in intellectu creato […] se habet ad ipsum cognitum sicut mensuratum ad mensura, et ita sicut 
‘posterius naturaliter’ ad prius ; quare unitas eius necessario dependet ab unitate obiecti mensurantis. 
Igitur necesse est aliquod unum obiectum esse mensuram eius. Sed obiectum quod est mensura 
eius, est ei adaequatum ; ergo non est ratio cognoscendi alia, nisi quia continetur virtualiter in primo 
obiecto quos est mensura eius ». See also Demange, Jean Duns Scot, ch. V.
17 Cf. Ord., d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. III, p. 74, n. 120 : « Potentiam enim et obiectum non oportet 
assimilari in modo essendi : se habent enim ut motivum et mobile, et ista se habent ut dissimilia, 
quia ut actus et potentia ; sunt tamen proportionata, quia ista proportio requirit dissimilitudinem 
proportionatorum, sicut communiter est in proportione, — sicut patet de materia et forma, parte 
et toto, causa et causato, et ceteris proportionibus » ; prol., pars 3, q. 1-3, ed. Vat. I, p. 100, n. 148 : 
« proportio obiecti ad potentiam est proportio motivi ad mobile vel activi ad passivum » ;  Quaest. 
super Met., II, q. 2-3, OPh. III, pp. 222-223, n. 75 : « Ad illud ergo de proportione inter obiectum et 
potentiam, dicendum quod non requiritur proportio in essentia, nec in modo essendi ; similiter nec 
in natura. […] Sed requiritur proportio motivi et mobilis ».
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make his view clear, it is important to distinguish what Scotus calls the first act, 
i.e. the first actualization of the intellect, which concerns the intellect’s being 
(modum essendi), from the second act, the second actualization, which instead 
concerns the intellect’s operation (modus cognoscendi). On this distinction, when 
the act of cognition is achieved, the intellect assimilates the cognized object to 
itself, but the intellect conserves its nature, not transforming its essence into the 
cognized object’s essence18. 
It is clear that in Scotus the first act, that is, the intellect’s being, depends on 
the relation with being, which is the first object of the intellect. In this respect, 
being is what actualizes the potentiality of the intellect to exist. Moreover, being 
is also the only essence that can move the intellect to the second act. ‘To move 
the intellect’ means ‘to activate the intellect’, in a metaphysical as well as in an 
epistemological sense, to the second act. Finally, thanks to the presence of being 
in every essence, the human intellect is able to know everything19.
Now, from a cognitive point of view, being is the simplest20, the most 
indeterminate21 and the most common concept.22 It should be noted, on the 
other hand, that also the capacity of the human intellect is, de jure, potentially 
infinite. The human intellect has an indeterminate capacity that makes it able to 
determine itself towards every determinate cognition. Scotus explains that this 
indetermination concerns the intellect’s being an active agent (indeterminatio 
agentis), that is, the agent’s capacity of acting toward a thing, and not the so-called 
material indetermination, namely the matter’s potentiality of becoming any form 
18 Ibid., pp. 74-75, n. 122 : « Aliud est loqui de modo essendi ipsius potentiae in se, et aliud est loqui 
de ipsa in quantum ipsa est sub actu secundo, vel dispositione proxima ad actum secundum, qui sit 
aliud a natura potentiae. Nunc autem est quod potentia cognoscens assimilatur cognito. Verum est, per 
actum suum cognoscendi, qui est quaedam similitudo obiecti, vel per speciem, disponentem de proximo 
ad cognoscendum, — sed ex hoc concludere ipsum intellectum, in se naturaliter, habere modum essendi 
similem modo essendi obiecti, vel e converso, est facere fallaciam accidentis et figurae dictionis ».
19 The first object of a faculty is a necessary condition for a faculty to operate. The nature of 
every faculty is characterized by this intentional connection with the faculty’s first object. This 
doctrine was also held by Thomas Aquinas, although Duns Scotus criticizes him on this point. See 
e.g. tHomaS De aquino, Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 9, a. 1, in Sancti tHomae aquinatiS Opera Omnia, 
Ex Typographia polyglotta s.c. De propaganda fide, Roma 1891, vol. VI, p. 74b : « obiectum movet, 
determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis [...]. Primum autem principium formale est ens 
et verum universale, quod est obiectum intellectus ».
20 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1-2, ed. Vat. III, p. 49, n. 71 : « conceptus ‘simpliciter simplex’ est qui 
non est resolubilis in plures conceptus, ut conceptus entis vel ultimae differentiae ».
21 Ibid., pp. 104-105, n. 66. See also Quaestiones super secundum et tertium libro De anima (= 
Quaest. super De an.), q. 19, edd. B.-C. Bazán et al., in ioanniS DunS Scoti Opera Philosophica, vol. V, 
The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 2006, p. 323, n. 35.
22 Ord., I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. III, p. 113, n. 186 : « nihil potest adaequari intellectui nostro 
ex natura potentiae in ratione primi obiecti nisi communissimum ».
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(indeterminatio materialis). In fact, the intellect is an act with an active potency 
that is able to produce an infinite series of concepts23. For this reason, according 
to Scotus, the human intellect is really a nou`~ poihtikov~ (productive intellect) 
and at the beginning is not turned to a particular being, but only to being in its 
indeterminate and widest extension24.
However, the indetermination of being does not imply the impossibility, 
for being, to be determined. Scotus notes that being does not have a negative 
indetermination (indeterminatio negativa), but only a privative indetermination 
(indeterminatio privativa), which expresses the possibility of receiving an infinite 
series of possible determinations. What is indeterminate in a negative sense cannot 
further be determined. For example, the individual being is not able to receive 
another determination because it is complete in itself. On the contrary, what is 
indeterminate in a privative sense can receive an infinite series of determinations25. 
With respect to the feature of indetermination, being and the intellect display 
a common characteristic which allows for a kind of convertibility of entity and 
intelligibility. This convertibility represents the condition of possibility of science 
and, in particular, of metaphysics.
1.3. The First Object of the Human Intellect and the Subject-Matter of Metaphysics
Although what has been said above would seem rather clear in itself, Scotus 
raises in his Ordinatio further questions about being. One is especially significant 
for the present issue : Is being, as the first object of the intellect, a metaphysical 
23 Ibid., d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, pp. 325-326, n. 545 : « Cum arguitur post de indeterminatione intellectus 
ad diversos actus et obiecta, — respondeo quod aliqua est ‘indeterminatio materialis’, propter 
defectum actus, aliqua est ‘indeterminatio agentis’, propter illimitationem virtutis activae, sicut sol est 
indeterminatus ad generandum multa. ‘Primo modo indeterminatum’ non agit nisi determinetur per 
aliquem actum, quia alias non est in actu sufficiente sed in potentia ; ‘secundo modo indeterminatum’ 
nulla alia forma a se determinatur, sed ex se determinatur ad producendum quemcumque effectum 
ad quem ex se est indeterminatum, et hoc praesente passo receptivo, sicut sol praesente passo generat 
quocumque generabile, ex quo ipsum natum est generari ».
24 Ibid., d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, p. 77, n. 124 : « Ens enim in quantum ens, communius est quocumque 
alio conceptu primae intentionis (secunda intentio non est primum obiectum), et sic intelligitur nulla 
contractione omnino cointellecta — nec habitudine ad sensibile, nec quacumque ».
25 Ibid., d. 3, pars 1, q. 1-2, pp. 66-67, n. 105 : « et cum arguitur quod “ ‘indeterminatum negative’ 
est magis indeterminatum quam ‘indeterminatum privative’ ” — nego, loquendo de indeterminatione 
ad propositum, qualis scilicet est in primo intellecto [sc. ente], quia ‘indeterminatum negative’ est 
singulare, et tale non est magis indeterminatum quam ‘indeterminatum privative’. Indeterminatio 
autem negativa, scilicet repugnantia ad determinari, etsi sit aliquo modo maior quam indeterminatio 
privativa, non tamen tale indeterminatum prius occurrit intellectui, quia tale non est confusum sed 
distinctissimum cognoscibile ».
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concept or a logical one ?26 There is not a simple answer to this question. In the 
Ordinatio and in the Lectura, Scotus’s answer is that being is not a logical concept, 
but only a metaphysical concept27, that is, a first intention28. The distinction between 
metaphysical concepts and logical concepts, that is, between first intentions and 
second intentions, relates to the distinction between essence and logical universal. 
As known, Scotus endorses Avicenna’s doctrine of the threefold consideration of 
essence and according to this doctrine, essence absolutely considered is indifferent 
to ‘being universal’ and ‘being particular’, to ‘being in the soul’ or ‘being outside 
the soul’. On the contrary, the logical universal exists only in the intellect and is 
essentially characterized by the property of being predicable of many things, a 
property that our intellect attaches to the essence when it considers it as existing 
in the intellect.
Scotus holds that being and the most general concepts do not have an essence 
(quidditas) in the proper sense. Nevertheless, he recognizes that for the most 
general concepts to possess an essence, it suffices that they can be predicated 
in quid of their inferiors29. Now, when being is taken as the first object of the 
intellect, it is a univocal concept that is able to virtually include, at the same time 
26 Cf. Ord., II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, ed. Vat. VII, pp. 402-404, nn. 30-33 : « Natura est indifferens ad 
unitatem singularitatis ; non igitur est de se sic illa una, scilicet unitate singularitatis. Qualiter autem hoc 
debeat intelligi, potest aliqualiter videri per dictum Avicennae V Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod ‘equinitas 
sit tantum equinitas, — nec est de se una nec plures, nec universalis nec particularis’. Intelligo : non 
est ‘ex se una’ unitate numerali, nec ‘plures’ pluritate opposita illi unitati ; nec ‘universalis’ actu est (eo 
modo scilicet quo aliquid est universale ut est obiectum intellectus), nec est ‘particularis’ de se. Licet 
enim numquam sit realiter sine aliquo istorum, de se tamen non est aliquod istorum, sed est prius 
naturaliter omnibus istis, — et secundum prioritatem naturalem est ‘quod quid est’ per se obiectum 
intellectus, et per se, ut sic, consideratur a metaphysico et exprimitur per definitionem ; et propositiones 
‘verae primo modo’ sunt verae ratione quiditatis sic acceptae, quia nihil dicitur ‘per se primo modo’ 
de quiditate nisi quod includitur in ea essentialiter, in quantum ipsa abstrahitur ab omnibus istis, 
quae sunt posteriora naturaliter ipsa. Non solum autem ipsa natura de se est indifferens ad esse in 
intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc et ad esse universale et particulare (sive singulare), — sed etiam 
ipsa, habens esse in intellectu, non habet primo ex se universalitatem. Licet enim ista intelligatur 
sub universalitate ut sub modo intelligendi ipsam, tamen universalitas non est pars eius conceptus 
primi, quia non conceptus metaphysici, sed logici (logicus enim considerat secundas intentiones, 
applicatas primis secundum ipsum). Prima ergo intellectio est ‘naturae’ ut non cointelligitur aliquis 
modus, neque qui est eius in intellectu, neque qui est eius extra intellectum ; licet illius intellecti 
modus intelligendi sit universalitas, sed non modus intellectus ! ».
27 Cf. Lect., I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1-2, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 235, n. 29.
28 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. III, p. 77, n. 124 : « Ens enim in quantum ens, communius 
est quocumque alio conceptu primae intentionis (secunda intentio non est primum obiectum) ».
29 Cf. Quaest. super Met., I, q. 1, OPh. III, pp. 40-41, n. 75 : « cum dicitur ‘ens non habet quid 
quia est transcendens’, — responsio : hoc concluderet aequaliter de omni generalissimo, quia nullum 
generalissimum habet quiditatem proprie dictam. Tamen quodlibet habet quid ; tum quia habet essentiam ; 
tum quia alias non praedicaretur in quid de aliquo ». Scotus seems to consider valid this argument.
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and in the same way, infinite being and finite being. But in the Ordinatio Scotus 
maintains that, for the metaphysician, being is not a univocal concept. First of 
all, he admits that accidents have a relation of attribution with the substance. In 
this case, we cannot consider being as univocal, for an accident’s being is different 
from a substance’s being ; nevertheless, Scotus concedes that the intellect can 
abstract a univocal concept that is common to accidents and substance30. In the 
Questions on the Metaphysics, Scotus reinforces this conclusion by observing that 
the subject-matter of metaphysics is not being taken as common to all things (ens 
communissimum)31, that is, as a concept including real being (ens reale) and being 
of reason (ens rationis), God and creature, substance and accident. Scotus makes 
a clear statement on this issue by explaining that if being in its total community 
(ens secundum totam communitatem) were the subject-matter of metaphysics, it 
would not have a cause ; but being in its total community includes every possible 
cause, in particular God ; therefore it cannot be the subject-matter of metaphysics. 
Since an object is known only when its cause is known, it is impossible for a 
science to study being in its total community. The subject-matter of metaphysics, 
by consequence, is the created being (ens creatum), which can be divided into 
the ten categories ; such a being is caused by God32. It is rather clear that, for the 
metaphysician, substance takes primacy over accidents and God33. To understand 
30 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. III, pp. 100-101, n. 163 : « Philosophus VII Physicorum dicit 
quod ‘in genere latent aequivocationes’, propter quas non potest esse comparatio secundum genus. Non 
tamen est aequivocatio quantum ad logicum, qui ponit diversos conceptus, sed quantum ad realem 
philosophum, est aequivocatio, quia non est ibi unitas naturae. Ita igitur omnes auctoritates quae 
essent in Metaphysica et Physica, quae essent de hac materia, possent exponi, propter diversitatem 
realem illorum in quibus est attributio, cum qua stat tamen unitas conceptus abstrahibilis ab eis 
[…]. Concedo tunc quod totum quod accidens est, attributionem habet essentialem ad substantiam, 
et tamen ab hoc et ab illo potest conceptus communis abstrahi ». See also Quaest. super De an., q. 21 
(OPh. V, p. 224, n. 37), an early text that is however more problematical because Scotus introduces 
the notion of ‘logical’ univocity as distinct from ‘metaphysical’ analogy.
31 The expression ‘being taken as common to all things’ (ens communissimum) is used by Scotus 
in at least two different ways. As we shall see later, it can comprise every real being (ens reale), or 
can also extend its meaning to every being of reason (ens rationis).
32 Quaest. super Met., I, q. 1, OPh. III, adnotationes interpolatae, p. 15 : « Nota quod, secundum 
communiter loquentes, ens est hic subiectum in quantum est commune ad decem praedicamenta, et 
non in quantum est commune ad omne ens, sive reale sive rationis sive privativi, quia talia non cadunt 
per se sub scientia reali, cuiusmodi est metaphysica. Etiam si ens secundum totam communitatem 
esset hic [subiectum], haberet causam sui esse et per consequens omne ens et etiam Deus, quia quod 
est subiectum scientiae, oportet quod habeat causam sui et partes etc. Hoc autem est impossibile, 
ergo etc. Intelligitur ergo de ente creato, quia tale habet causam sui esse tantummodo ». For more on 
this doctrine, see A. zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik ? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der 
Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen, Peeters, Leuven 19982.
33 On the primacy of substance in Scotus’s Metaphysics, see also o. BoulnoiS, Métaphysiques 
rebelles. Genèse et structures d’une science au Moyen Age, PUF, Paris 2013, pp. 261-311. 
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better this statement, recall that, for Scotus, the subject-matter of metaphysics 
is being qua being (ens in quantum ens) or being according to its entity (ens 
secundum suam entitatem)34, and that the primacy in question is a primacy of 
origin (prioritas originis) and not a primacy of intention (prioritas intentionis). 
We can clarify the meaning of these two primacies by saying that with respect 
to the primacy of origin, the subject-matter of metaphysics is the totality of 
beings, regardless of their relationship with God ; but with respect to the primacy 
of intention, God can be considered the proper subject-matter of metaphysics 
because God is what is finally ‘intended’, i.e. understood, by every particular 
knowledge about beings35. Scotus is not here drawing a distinction between two 
metaphysics, but between two different points of view on metaphysics. If we 
consider what is immediately knowable by us, we must turn to the most general 
subject-matter, which is being qua being, without any particular determination. 
But if we consider the ultimate aim of metaphysics, God holds the primacy 
because He is the aim of every knowledge. By speaking in this way, Scotus tries 
to reconcile the different statements about the subject-matter of Metaphysics 
that can be found in Aristotle’s work36. In fact, according to Scotus, metaphysics 
is about both the transcendentals — like being, one, true and good — and the 
highest causes, like God37. However, since being qua being is the most knowable 
concept for human beings in via, it holds epistemological priority as compared 
34 Cf. Quaest. super Met., I, q. 1, OPh. III, p. 41, n. 78 : « cum dicitur ‘principia entis in quantum 
ens’, non intelligitur ly ‘in quantum’ reduplicative ita quod denotet causam, sed specificative, ut is 
sit sensus : entis in quantum ens, id est, entis secundum suam entitatem ».
35 Ibid., p. 63, nn. 137, 140: « Prima dubitatio est circa hoc quod ponitur Deum esse subiectum 
in metaphysica, et quod consideret entia ut attribuuntur ad Deum, quoniam consideratio entium 
in quantum entia videtur esse prior quam in quantum attribuuntur ad primum ens; igitur erit alia 
metpahysica prior, quae consideret entia in quantum entia, quam illa quae ponitur de Deo ut de 
subiecto ». […] Ad primam rationem istius dubitationis dicendum est quod illa consideratio, qua 
considerantur entia in se, prior est prioritate originis […], sed non prioritate intentionis. Et primum 
subiectum ponitur cuius cognitio principaliter intenditur ; vel ad quod, ut a principium, tota aggregatio 
multarum cognitionum principaliter ordinatur ».
36 See e.g. Met., IV, 1, and VI, 1.
37 Cf. Quaest. super Met., I, q. 1, OPh. III, p. 15. On transcendentals in Scotus’s philosophy, see A. 
B. wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, The Franciscan 
Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1946 (rep. Kessinger, Whitefish 2008) ; S. D. Dumont, Transcendental 
Being. Scotus and Scotists, « Topoi », 11, 1992, pp. 135-148 ; J. a. aertSen, Being and One. The Doctrine 
of Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus, « Franciscan Studies », 56, 1998, pp. 47-64 ; J. J. E. 
gracia, Scotus’ Conception of Metaphysics. The Study of the Transcendentals, « Franciscan Studies », 
56, 1998, pp. 153-168 ; t. S. leite, Ontologia e teoria dos transcendentes na Metafísica de Duns Scotus, 
in L. A. De Boni et al. eds., João Duns Scotus (1308-2008). Homenagem de scotistas lusófonos, EST, 
Porto Alegre/Bragança Paulista 2008, pp. 206-223.
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to God38. According to a text from the Questions on the Metaphysics, VI, q. 1, 
the subject-matter of metaphysics is characterized as one and common (unum 
commune) and as a real object (obiectum reale), which can be abstracted from a 
multiplicity of beings. In the same text, Scotus also affirms that this real object 
is divided into the ten most general concepts, which are the ten categories39, and 
that God, since He does not belong to any category, exceeds the subject-matter 
of metaphysics. In the Ordinatio Scotus calls ‘finite being’ this general concept 
of being that is common to the ten categories, but this concept is different from 
being that is common and indifferent to ‘infinite being’ and ‘finite being’40. 
To summarize what has been said so far, being as the first object of the 
intellect and being as the subject-matter of metaphysics display some different 
characteristics. The former is understood by the human intellect as an univocal 
concept that is indifferent to God and creature, substance and accident, while the 
latter is fundamentally the created being as divided into ten categories and as caused 
by God, which is the final goal of every metaphysical knowledge. The change of 
doctrine from the first to the second draft of the Questions on the Metaphysics, IV, 
q. 1, seems to concern the analogy or univocity of the concept of being as common 
to the ten categories and not of the concept of being as common to God and the 
creatures41. Moreover, until the Ordinatio Scotus excludes the being of reason 
both from the object of the intellect and from the subject-matter of metaphysics.
38 Although Gilson does not sharply distinguish between the first and most adequate object and the 
subject-matter of metaphysics, what he wrote about the place of God in Scotus’s metaphysics remains 
true : « Cet être premier, dont elle établit l’existence, n’est pas son propre sujet, mais celui de la théologie, 
car s’il appartient à la théologie de traiter de Dieu comme de son sujet propre, la métaphysique se voit 
par là même interdire le droit de le revendiquer aussi comme sien. Elle ne l’atteint qu’indirectement. 
La métaphysique est pour l’homme la science naturelle suprême, parce que le sujet dont elle traite 
est le sujet ici-bas accessible à l’intellect humain, mais ce sujet n’est pas Dieu, c’est l’être. D’où cette 
double conséquence : aucun savoir naturel humain ne peut parler de Dieu connu sous quelque notion 
qui lui soit propre, et la métaphysique est un savoir qui tend vers l’objet de la théologie comme vers 
son terme » (gilSon, Jean Duns Scot, p. 82).
39 Cf. Quaest. super Met., VI, q. 1, OPh. IV, pp. 19-20, nn. 47-48 : « ab omnibus speculabilibus 
realibus potest unum commune, scilicet ens, abstrahi, de cuius communitate ALIBI dictum est. […] 
Ens autem est obiectum reale. Quod patet, quia de rebus dicitur in quid, et est obiectum proprie 
speculabile […]. Sub ente autem prima dividentia occurrunt decem generalissima de quibus ex 
principiis notis via sensus non sunt aliae passiones demonstrabiles nisi transcendentes ». 
40 Cf. Ord., I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. IV, pp. 205-206, n. 113 : « Ens prius dividitur in infinitum 
et finitum quam in decem predicamenta, quia alterum istorum, scilicet ‘infinitum’, est commune ad 
decem genera ; ergo quaecumque conveniunt enti ut indifferens ad finitum et infinitum, vel ut est 
proprium enti infinito, conveniunt sibi non ut determinatur ad genus sed ut prius, et per consequens 
ut est transcendens et est extra omne genus » ; see also, Lect., I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. XVII, p. 37, 
n. 107. On this point, see a. nannini, Univocità metafisica dell’ens e individuazione mediante intensità di 
potenza in Duns Scoto, « Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica », 103/3, 2011, pp. 389-423.
41 Scotus presents the question as follows : « questio est utrum possit esse aliquis conceptus 
communis decem generibus, quocumque nomine illud significetur, sive per ‘ens’ sive per aliud nomen » 
(Quaest. super Met., IV, q. 1, OPh. IV, p. 301, n. 28).
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Certainly, the possibility of metaphysics is bound tightly to the intellect’s 
capacity and to its inclination to being. Scotus holds that the first object of the 
intellect cannot be more particular than being qua being, otherwise metaphysics 
would be less transcendent than physics and being would not be understood by 
us42. In the Ordinatio Scotus clarifies this statement as follows :
« Alia, de metaphysica, probat quod ens ut ‘hoc intelligibile’ intelligitur a nobis, 
sed si esset primum obiectum, hoc esset secundum totam indifferentiam ad omnia 
in quibus salvatur, non ut aliquod unum intelligibile in se, — et quidlibet illius 
indifferentiae posset intelligi »43.
In this passage Scotus seems to affirm that the object of the intellect is absolutely 
indifferent to any possible determination, such as God and creature. On the other 
hand, the subject-matter of metaphysics expresses a determinate intelligible being 
(hoc intelligibile). Scotus describes it as a ‘this’ intelligible (hoc intelligibile), that 
is, a determinate concept of being. On the contrary, the first object of the intellect 
is characterized by no reference to the concept of determination. As a matter of 
fact, Scotus always characterizes it as indifferent and indeterminate.
1.4. The Unity of Being
In Scotus’s Ordinatio there is also a second question about being that is 
significant for the present issue. It concerns the univocity of being44. In the 
Ordinatio Scotus considers the univocity of being as common to God and creature 
and not only to substance and accident, as he seems to do in the Questions on 
the Metaphysics.
42 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. III, p. 73, n. 118 : « quidquid per se cognoscitur a potentia 
cognitiva, vel est eius obiectum primum, vel continetur sub eius obiecto primo ; ens ut ens est communius 
sensibili, per se intelligitur a nobis, alias metaphysica non esset magis scientia transcendens quam 
physica ; igitur non potest aliquid esse primum obiectum intellectus nostri quod sit particularius 
ente, quia tunc ens in se nullo modo intelligeretur a nobis ».
43 Ibid., p. 77, n. 124. For a possible motivation for this distinction, see Demange, Jean Duns Scot, 
pp. 432-434.
44 Cf. o. BoulnoiS, Introduction, in iD., Jean Duns Scot. Sur la connaissance de Dieu et l’univocité de 
l’étant, PUF, Paris 1998 ; iD., Scotus’ Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradition of Metaphysics, in 
J. a. aertSen, a. SPeer eds., Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter ? Akten des X Internationalen Kongresses 
für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25 
bis 30 August 1997 in Erfurt, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1998 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26), pp. 
193-212 ; l. a. De Boni, Duns Scotus and the Univocity of the Concept of Being, in R. H. PicH ed., New 
Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia transcendens. Proceedings of the Second International Conference 
of Medieval Philosophy, held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) (Porto 
Alegre/Brazil, 15-18 August 2006), Brepols, Turnhout 2007, pp. 91-113.
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For Scotus, being considered as the first object of the intellect is a univocal 
concept which 
« possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of one and the same 
thing would be a contradiction. It also has sufficient unity to serve as the middle term 
of a syllogism, so that wherever two extremes are united by a middle term that is one 
in this way, we may conclude to the union of the two extremes among themselves »45. 
Since this doctrine could reduce being to a genus, Scotus is urged to solve 
two objections that call into question the univocity of being. The first objection 
states that the extremes of a contradiction do not have any univocal concept in 
common. For example, God and creature are the extremes of a contradiction, just 
as are ‘all that depends’ and ‘all that does not depend’ or ‘all that is caused’ and 
‘all that is not caused’46. The second objection is similar to the first and states that 
no concept is neutral (neuter) with regard to the extremes of a contradiction47.
Scotus responds by noting that the extremes of a contradiction are able to 
divide exhaustively the common genus under which they fall and, thus, to receive 
the predication of the contradiction and at the same time to have something 
abstract (aliquid abstractum) or a substrate (substratum) common to them48. 
On the one hand, by the term ‘abstract’ Scotus probably wants to refer to the 
aristotelian term cwristov~49, which signifies what is abstracted in an ontological 
sense50. On the other hand, by the term ‘substrate’ Scotus probably wants to 
45 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars I, q. 1-2, ed. Vat. III, p. 18, n. 26 : « univocum conceptum dico, qui ita 
est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem ; 
sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis 
concludantur inter se uniri » (translation by a. B. wolter, Duns Scotus. Philosophical Writings, 
Hackett, Indianapolis 19872, p. 20).
46 Cf. Ord., I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. IV, p. 171, n. 45 : « Prima est ista : illis quae sunt totaliter 
et immediate sub extremis contradictionis, nihil est commune univocum ; Deus et creatura sunt 
totaliter et immediate sub extremis contradictionis — dependere et non dependere, causatum et non 
causatum, esse ab alio et non ab alio ; ergo nihil est eis commune univocum ».
47 Ibid., p. 171, n. 46 : « Item, secundo sic, et est confirmatio alterius rationis : omnis conceptus 
communis est neuter respectu illorum quibus est communis ; nullus est conceptus neuter respectu 
contradictorium, quia est alter eorum ; ergo etc. ».
48 Ibid., pp. 189-190, n. 80 : « Accipe tunc maiorem quod quaecumque sunt talia quibus conveniunt 
extrema contradictionis ‘ipsa non univocantur in aliquo’ : ista maior est falsa, nam omnia per se 
dividentia aliquod commune sunt talia quod de ipsis dicuntur extrema contradictionis, et tamen 
univocantur in ipso diviso. Ita in proposito : possunt ista secundum se tota recipere praedicationem 
contradictionis, et tamen possunt habere aliquid abstractum — vel substratum illis extremis illius 
contradictionis — quod est commune ambobus ».
49 Cf. Met., VI, 1, 1026a16.
50 This meaning of ‘what is abstracted’ must be distinguished from the psychological meaning of 
abstraction expressed by the Aristotelian term ajfaivresi~. See e.g. De anima, I, 1, 403b10-20.
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refer to the Aristotelian term uJpokeivmenon although, in the Aristotelian doctrine, 
only the genus is usually considered the common substrate of the differentiae51. 
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle holds that the uJpokeivmenon is not predicated of any 
other thing, but it is that of which every other thing is predicated52. But this 
cannot be the case of being. In fact, as seen above, being can be predicated of 
everything. But in the Aristotelian writings, there is also another meaning of the 
term uJpokeivmenon. In the Physics, Book V, for example, Aristotle explains that 
the term uJpokeivmenon fundamentally means « what is affirmatively expressed »53. 
According to this meaning, we can say that being is the first and the most common 
substrate because it is the first thing that is affirmatively expressed of everything 
and every determination of being can be affirmatively expressed thanks to being. 
If this is what Scotus meant by the term ‘substrate’ in the text from the Ordinatio 
mentioned above, we can consider being as the first predicate and the necessary 
condition for every predication.
However, Scotus carefully notes that being must not be considered as a genus. 
Being is not formally neutral (neuter formaliter) with respect to the extremes of a 
contradiction, while this is the case with a genus such as ‘animal’, which is formally 
neutral with respect to its specific differentiae (‘rational’ and ‘irrational’)54. Genus 
is formally neutral because its specific differentiae are not part of its essence, but 
added to it extrinsically.
In order to differentiate being and genus, Scotus distinguishes between formal 
diversity, which pertains to generic concepts, and the diversity which is proper to 
being. The formal diversity between the genre A and its specific differentiae B and 
non-B means that B and non-B are extrinsically added to A because A is neither 
formally B nor formally non-B. The consequence is that A cannot contain at the 
same time B and non-B. By contrast, the diversity between being and the extremes 
of the contradiction means that being can include two possibly contradictory 
concepts or things. In this way, Scotus defends the transcendental capacity 
of being to contain, thanks to its virtuality, the extremes of a contradiction as 
compossible things. Differently from what happens with a genus, there is nothing 
51 Cf. e.g. Met., V, 6, 1016a24-28.
52 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1028b36-37.
53 Cf. Phys., V, 1, 225a6-7.
54 Cf. Ord., I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. IV, p. 190, n. 81 : « Ad confirmationem ‘de neutro’ dico quod 
conceptus etiam communis duobus, est neuter formaliter, et ita concedo conclusionem quod conceptus 
entis non est formaliter conceptus creati nec increati ; si autem intelligatur quod iste conceptus est ita 
neuter quod neutrum contradictorium dicatur de eo, falsum est. Ita est enim de rationali et irrationali, 
quod conceptus animalis est respectu eorum neuter formaliter, et tamen illud quod concipitur non est 
neutrum, sed vere est alterum istorum. Alterum enim contradictorium dicitur de quolibet, et tamen 
non oportet quemlibet conceptum esse formaliter alterum conceptum contradictorium ».
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outside being. For this reason every determination of being must be present in 
being itself, not in actuality of course, but only in a possible and virtual way. 
This presence must be understood in a negative way : there is nothing in being 
that prevents it from becoming one or the other horn of a contradiction. If every 
determination of being were present in actuality within being, in fact, the latter 
would be a contradictory object. In a parallel text from the Reportata Parisiensia, 
Scotus makes this point clearer, explaining that what contracts being is an intrinsic 
grade (intrinsecum gradum) or mode of being (modum entitatis). What contracts 
being is not extrinsic to it, while the specific differentia designates a different 
reality from the genus (aliam realitatem a realitate generis)55.
The univocity of being is introduced by Scotus to make possible our talk 
about God. But from an epistemological point of view, the unity of being is more 
fundamental than its univocity. As seen above, the definition of ‘univocal concept’ 
is grounded on the concept of unity. Univocity refers to the predicability of being, 
while the unity of being indicates an essential characteristic of being that is 
independent of its predicability. For without the unity of being knowledge and 
predication are impossible. According to Scotus, being is a first intention, that 
is, a metaphysical concept like the concepts of any other common nature ; it is 
not a second intention, that is, a logical concept. Being designates the necessary 
condition for conceptualization and predication because of its presence in every 
possible knowledge and in every possible predicate.
Scotus also relates the distinction between unity and univocity to the distinction 
between community and universality. This is a noteworthy feature of Scotus’s 
metaphysics. Community signifies the possibility, for being, of being present in 
every thing. On the contrary, we can talk of universality when being is thought 
of and it is, then, able to be predicated of different things, so that being is, 
from the outset, indifferent to predication56. As noted by Giorgio Pini, univocal 
or equivocal concepts are first intentions, but univocity is a second-intention 
property. A concept is called ‘univocal’ because it refers to some beings that have 
55 Cf. Rep. Par., I, d. 9, q. 5, ed. Vivès XXII, p. 172b, n. 17 : « Ex praedictis patet quod ens contrahitur 
ad Deum et creaturam per infinitum et finitum, non tamen sequitur quod ens sit genus, quia minus 
distat hoc contrahens a contrahibili quam differentia a genere, quia contrahens, ut infinitum, sive 
finitum, non dicit nisi intrinsecum gradum, sive modum entitatis ; differentia autem non sic, sed dicit 
aliam realitatem a realitate generis, ad quam realitas generis est in potentia, ut actuetur ».
56 For an emphasis on this distinction in Scotus, see a. De liBera, La querelle des universaux de 
Platon à la fin du Moyen Age, Seuil, Paris 1996, pp. 329-332. See also O. BoulnoiS, Réelles intentions : 
nature commune et universaux selon Duns Scot, « Revue de métaphysique et de morale », 97/1, 1992, 
pp. 3-33.
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been cognized by means of it. For this reason, univocity is a second-intention 
property which pertains to something inasmuch as it is cognized57.
But what kind of unity does being have ? According to Scotus, the unity of 
being is a real unity (unitas reale), but not a numerical one. Numerical unity is 
typical of every individual being, whereas real unity refers to what has an entity 
(entitas) in general58. For this reason, real unity is weaker than numerical unity.
The unity of being is also necessary for the intellect. As explained above, there 
is an essential relationship between every faculty (potentia) and its proper object. 
The object of a faculty must be adequate (adaequatum) to the faculty, that is, 
must have the same capacity as the faculty, and this is possible only if the first 
object is just one.
2. from tHe univocity of Being to Being aS aBSolute PoSSiBility
It is not easy to interpret Scotus’s view on being as formulated in the Ordinatio. 
This is because Scotus does not address in this work the issue of the distinction 
between being as the first object of the intellect and being as the subject-matter 
of metaphysics. The fact that this distinction has not sufficiently been argued 
perhaps explains why Scotus reconsiders his position and modifies it. As said in 
the introduction, in Scotus’s works there is a shift from univocal being to possible 
being. Possible being designates the most common extension of being, for it 
includes not only infinite being and finite being, but also the being of reason (ens 
rationis). This development emerges if one looks at the Reportata Parisiensia and 
the Quaestiones quodlibetales. In this second part, we shall discuss the genesis of 
this change in Scotus’s doctrine of being as the first object of the intellect.
2.1. The Possible Being in Reportata Parisiensia, II, d. 24, q. un.
In order to understand the rising importance of the concept of possible being 
in Scotus’s doctrine, it is necessary to consider what Scotus says in the Reportata 
Parisiensia, II, d. 24, q. un.59. In this context, Scotus answers the question 
57 Cf. Pini, Scoto e l’analogia, p. 83. 
58 This is the case of every common nature.
59 On the reliability of Reportata Parisiensia for the interpretation of Scotus’s thought see H. BarnaBa, 
Il problema delle ‘Reportationes’ nell’eredità dottrinale del B. Giovanni Duns Scoto OFM, in M. C. nunez 
ed., Giovanni Duns Scoto. Studi e ricerche nel VII centenario della sua morte, 2 vols., Antonianum, Roma 
2008, vol. I, pp. 59-128. See also, G. leiBolD, H. kraml, Text und Überlieferungsprobleme der Reportata 
Parisiensia des Johannes Duns Scotus, in L. HonnefelDer et al. eds., Johannes Duns Scotus 1308-2008. 
Die philosophischen Perspektiven seines Werkes / Investigations into His Philosophy. Proceedings of 
“The Quadruple Congress” on John Duns Scotus, part 3, The Franciscan Institute - Aschendorff, St. 
Bonaventure, N. Y. - Münster 2010, pp. 187-195.
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concerning the difference between superior reason (ratio superior) and inferior 
reason (ratio inferior)60. At the beginning of his solution, Scotus holds that a faculty 
is distinguished from another in virtue of its formal object61. For example, the 
formal object of seeing is color and no other faculty has color as its proper object. 
Specifically, the formal object of seeing is not a particular species of color, like 
white or black, but the genus color. Generally speaking, the formal object of a 
faculty has the same extension as its faculty. Nevertheless, the faculty of seeing 
does not perceive color in general, but only specific colors such as white, black 
and so on. As a result, the formal objects of the faculties that depend on a physical 
organ (potentiae organicae) are nothing but abstractions produced by the human 
intellect62. In particular, organic faculties have no formal object in common.
Faculties that are not bound to an organ (potentiae inorganicae) have formal 
objects that share the common feature of being ontologically separated, although 
not in virtue of an operation of the human intellect. For this reason, every non-
organic faculty is, as Scotus says, totius entis, that is, relates to all being63. But 
if this is true, what is the first object of the human intellect ? Scotus’s answer is 
that univocal being is the first object of the intellect, and this object is common 
both to infinite being and to finite being. The human intellect can abstract it from 
everything that is knowable, but being does not become the first object of the 
human intellect in virtue of an act of psychological abstraction64. The psychological 
abstraction is only the means by which the intellect can gain awareness of the 
first object of the intellect.
However, all the thinkers who reject this position — like Henry of Ghent — 
maintain that the first adequate object of the intellect is God or, as an alternative, 
a confused concept of being that seems at first univocal but is analogical after 
closer inspection. If this were the case, Scotus continues, being would not be an 
analogical concept, but rather an equivocal one. For Scotus, neither God nor 
analogical being can be the first adequate object of the intellect. Those thinkers 
could continue to defend their position in two ways : either by admitting that 
60 Cf. Rep. Par., II, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vivès XXIII, p. 112.
61 Ibid., p. 115a, n. 11 : « cum dicitur potentiae distinguuntur per obiecta, dicitur quod verum est 
per obiecta formalia ; visus enim non distinguitur per obiecta materialia, cuiusmodi sunt album et 
nigrum, sed per obiectum formale adaequatum ».
62 Ibid. : « Unde forte visus nunquam videret colorem, nisi quia album, vel nigrum. Unde illud 
obiectum abstractum, quod est obiectum adaequatum potentiae, fit sic abstractum per intellectum ».
63 Ibid., p. 115a-b, n. 11 : « Ideo dico quod dissimiliter est de potentiis non organicis, quia sicut 
potentiae non organicae sunt abstractae a materia, hoc est, non requirunt talem complexionem 
alicuius organi, sicut obiecta sunt abstracta ; ideo quaelibet potentia non organica est totius entis ».
64 Ibid., p. 115b, n. 12 : « Dices, quod igitur est primum obiectum ipsius intellectus ? Dico, sustinendo 
quod ens univocum ad ens creatum, et increatum, est primum obiectum, non tamen propter abstractionem 
fit ipsum obiectum intellectus. Sed unus conceptus potest abstrahi a quolibet, quod est intelligibile ».
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there is no univocal concept for all beings, or by denying that there exists a first 
adequate object of the intellect. According to Scotus, this second answer looks 
more probable insofar as it respects the perfection of the faculty65.
In the last part of the text we are considering, Scotus seems to introduce an 
alternative doctrine. He observes that non-organic faculties have no univocal 
object in common and that the omnipotence of God does not concern a real and 
univocal being, but only possible being ; in the same vein, the first object of the 
human intellect must be identified with possible being. Nevertheless, Scotus 
makes it clear that possible being is only an intellectual object66, although it is 
not reducible to a being of reason. Thus, possible being constitutes the horizon 
of both God’s omnipotence and the human intellect’s cognition. But first of all, 
possible being is an object of God’s intellect.
In order to understand how this alternative theory differs from the theory 
of univocal being, consider that, for Scotus, a particular object, before it is in 
relation with the act of human intellection, is said to have only a possible being. 
At the same time, the act of human intellection would be contradictory if it were 
not intentionally related to the object, for otherwise the human intellect would be 
an absolute form67 just like the divine intellect. In the Ordinatio, however, Scotus 
does not consider a possible alternative doctrine to the theory of univocal being 
as the first object of the intellect ; possible being occurs simply as synonymous 
with what precedes the act of intellection and the original term of intellectual 
activity. It is probable that when introducing the alternative theory of possible 
65 Ibid. : « Vel secundum dicentes quod ens non est univocum, oportet dicere quod primum 
obiectum intellectus nostri sit Deus, quod tamen non credo, et tunc oportet eos dicere quod non 
oportet primum obiectum intellectus univocum omnibus, quae sunt intelligibilia. Vel oportet eos 
dicere quod non est primum obiectum adaequatum intellectui, quod videtur mihi probabilius propter 
perfectionem potentiae ».
66 Ibid., pp. 115b-116a : « Quia sicut videmus quod a sensibus partialibus abstrahitur commune 
obiectum, ut qualitas sensibilis, et ultra a sensibus exterioribus, et interioribus, tandem convenit 
concedere quod nullum unum obiectum sensibile univocum potest esse commune omnibus sensibus. 
Sic etiam obiectum omnipotentiae divinae, obiectum dico operabile, non potest esse aliquid 
adaequatum, nisi tantum ens possibile, quod non est unum in re, sed si aliquo modo hoc tantum est 
in intellectu, quia non potest esse aliquid univocum reale omnibus operabilibus a potentia divina, 
sic propter perfectionem intellectus ad tot se extendit, quod nullum unum objectum univocum habet 
sibi adaequatum ».
67 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, ed. Vat. III, p. 327, n. 546 : « Opinio est quod intellectus est principium 
intellectionis quantum ad substantiam, sed obiectum est principium quantum ad modificationem seu 
specificationem actus. — Contra : nihili nullum est principium ; intellectio, circumscripta modificatione 
seu specificatione, nihil est ; ergo etc. Maior intelligitur de nihilo quod includit contradictionem. 
Minor probatur, quia prius natura intellectum praecise est aliquid ‘possibile esse’ : sed intellectio 
sine hoc quod in eodem ‘nunc’ naturae sit alicuius obiecti, est contradictio, alioquin intellectio esset 
forma mere absoluta ».
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being as the first object of the human intellect, Scotus wished to account for the 
common experience condition of a thing that is thinkable but not yet thought 
in actuality. Following this idea, it seems clear that the possible being, since it 
is common to every particular cognition before any act of intellection has been 
generated, cannot be considered as a product of a cognitive operation.
In the Ordinatio, Scotus already clarified the meaning of the expression ‘possible 
being’. He explained that possible being signifies being in potency (ens in potentia) 
and distinguished possible being from cognized being (ens cognitum). Possible 
being has a potentiality oriented towards being in actuality, while cognized 
being has only a relative and accidental mode of being (esse secundum quid)68. In 
particular, possible being has only a logical possibility, called also potentia logica, 
which consists in a non-repugnance among the predicates of the same thing69.
2.2. The ens communissimum in the Quaestiones quodlibetales
In the Reportata Parisiensia, Scotus seems to advance two possible responses 
to the question of the first object of the intellect. This reveals the increasingly 
deeper attention paid by Scotus to this topic, an attention that gives rise to a 
change of view in his final work, the Quaestiones quodlibetales70. In the third 
question, Scotus unequivocally states that being, taken in its greatest extension 
(ens communissimum), is the first object of the intellect. The reason is that the 
first object of the intellect must refer to whatever is knowable by our intellect, 
so it must include both the being of reason (ens rationis) and real being (ens 
reale). Following this idea, Scotus holds that every science focuses on ens from 
a particular point of view. What matters for our argument is that, for Scotus, 
the term ‘being’ taken in its greatest extension signifies nothing but the absence 
of contradiction, and this condition simply indicates the pure intelligibility or 
non-contradictority of being 71. Scotus explains that this concept of being is not 
68 Cf. Ord., II, d. 1, q. 2, ed. Vat. VII, p. 49, n. 93 : « formaliter esse cognitum non sit esse possibile, 
quia ‘esse cognitum’ est esse in actu secundum quid, — esse autem possibile, est esse in potentia ad 
esse simpliciter, et non in actu ».
69 Cf. ibid., I, d. 7, q. 1, ed. Vat. IV, pp. 118-119, n. 27 ; Lectura, I, d. 7, q. un., ed. Vat. XVI, p. 484, n. 32.
70 This is a set of twenty-one disputed questions held at Paris probably either in Advent 1306 
or in Lent 1307. On this, see T. B. noone, H. francie roBertS, John Duns Scotus’ Quodlibet : A Brief 
Study of the Manuscripts and an Edition of Question 16, in C. ScHaBel ed., Theological Quodlibeta in 
the Middle Ages : The Fourteenth Century, Brill, Leiden 2007, pp. 131-159.
71 Cf. Quaestiones quodlibetales (= Quaest. quodl.), q. 3, Vivès, Paris 1891-1895, vols. XXV-
XXVI, vol. XXV, p. 114b, n. 2  : « Et isto intellectu communissimo, prout res vel ens dicitur quolibet 
conceptibile quod non includit contradictionem, […] posset poni ens primum obiectum intellectus, 
quia nihil potest esse intelligibile quod includit rationem entis isto modo, quia ut dictum est prius, 
includens contradictionem non est intelligibile, et isto modo, quaecunque scientia, quae non solum 
vocatur realis, sed etiam quae vocatur rationis, est de re, sive de ente ».
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that to which Avicenna refers in his Metaphysics72. It is necessary to point out 
that, according to Scotus, what is intelligible and non-contradictory corresponds 
to what is possible, that is, what has no intrinsic repugnance to being (esse)73. 
In the Quaestiones quodlibetales the topic of the univocity of being decreases in 
importance. Evidence of this is that Scotus no longer characterizes the first object 
of the intellect as univocal being. As a matter of fact, Scotus observes that it is 
irrelevant to decide whether being understood as common to the being of reason 
and real being is univocal or analogical.74 Up until the Quaestiones quodlibetales, 
q. 3, Scotus identified the first object of the intellect with being as common to 
every first intention (God and creature, substance and accident, and so on). Now, 
Scotus identifies it with being as common to first intentions (real being) and 
second intentions (being of reason). By such a move, Scotus extends the field of 
the first object of the intellect to every possible knowledge, to every intelligible.
In the Quaestiones quodlibetales, q. 3, Scotus considers the first object of the 
intellect as the ground and the condition of possibility for every science. The first 
object of the intellect, i.e. being in its community (ens in sua communitate), is the 
end of the intellect’s natural inclination, whereas the first object of the intellect 
ordinarily (in via) is the essence of the material thing (quiditas rei materialis), which 
expresses only a limited portion of being (ens limitatum)75. In this text, Scotus 
also distinguishes between two senses of ‘adequate object of the intellect’, with 
respect to the particular state of man before or after the original sin. It is worth 
noting that, for Scotus, the viator’s condition is not a natural state, but a state of 
72 Ibid., p. 114b, nn. 2-3 : « dicitur res, quod habere potest entitatem extra animam. Et isto modo 
videtur loqui Avicenna I Metaphys. cap. 5 quod ea quae sunt communia omnibus generibus, sunt 
res, et ens. Habemus ergo primum membrum sic, scilicet communissime, bipartitum, in illud scilicet 
quod non includit contradictionem qualecunque esse habeat, et in illud quod habet, vel habere potest, 
proprium esse extra intellectum, et isto modo, vel utroque modo, vel saltem secundo modo, accipit 
Avicenna res et ens, ut dictum est ».
73 cf. Ord., I, d. 43, q. un., ed. Vat. VI, p. 354, n. 7 : « possibile, secundum quod est terminus vel 
obiectum omnipotentiae, est illud cui non repugnat esse et quod non potest ex esse necessario ».
74 Cf. Quaest. quodl., q. 3, ed. Vivès XXV, p. 114b, n. 2 : « sive illa communitas sit Analogiae sive 
univocationis, de qua non curo modo » ; ibid., ed. Vivès XXVI, p. 40, n. 11 : « ens in sua communitate , 
sive sit univocationis, sive analogiae, non curo modo, etsi ponatur obiectum adaequatum cuiuscumque 
intellectus creati ».
75 Cf. Quaest. quodl., q. 14, ed. Vivès XXVI, p. 40a, n. 11 : « Diceretur quod obiectum primum 
naturale potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ad quod potentia inclinatur. Alio modo, ad quod potentia 
potest naturaliter attingere, scilicet, ex concursu causarum naturalium : ens in sua communitate, sive 
sit univocationis, sive analogiae, non curo modo, etsi ponatur obiectum adaequatum cuiuscunque 
intellectus creati, loquendo de obiecto adaequato primo modo : non tamen de obiecto adaequato 
secundo modo, imo sic pro quocunque statu, cuiuscunque intellectus creati praecise, ens limitatum est 
obiectum adaequatum, quia praecise illud potest attingi virtute causae naturaliter motivae intellectus ».
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penalty (poenalis) because of the original sin76. In the natural state, the first and 
adequate object of the human intellect is being while, after the original sin, the 
adequate object is a limited being, that is, the essence of the material thing77. In 
conclusion, in the Quaestiones quodlibetales the first object of the intellect is not a 
metaphysical concept, but what is able to include every metaphysical and logical 
concept. In that, Scotus’s solution in the Quaestiones quodlibetales substantially 
differs from the one in the Ordinatio and the Lectura. 
2.3. Ontological and Psychological Abstraction
Scotus often uses the expression ‘ens secundum totam indifferentiam’78 to refer 
to being as the first object as cognized by the human intellect. Such an expression 
refers to being as a concept produced by the human intellect by means of an act of 
psychological abstraction. As said above, according to Scotus, the human intellect 
is an active substance79 which is able to produce universal concepts. However, for 
Scotus, a real universal concept is not obtained through an act of psychological 
abstraction from a finite number of concepts of individuals, because it is impossible 
to find a more universal concept in a less universal concept80. For example, it is 
76 Ibid., pp. 46b-47a, n. 12 : « objectum adaequatum intellectui nostro ex natura potentiae non est 
aliquid specialius objecto intellectus Angeli, quia quidquid potest intelligi ab uno, et ab alio, et hoc 
saltem concedere debet Theologus, qui ponit istum statum non esse naturalem, nec istam impotentiam 
intelligendi, respectu multorum intelligibilium, esse naturalem, sed poenalem ». See also Ord., I, d. 
3, pars 1, q. 3, ed. cit., p. 113, n. 186.
77 Cf. Quaest. Quodl., q. 14, ed. Vivès XXVI, p. 46b, n. 12 : « Dico igitur, quod obiectum naturale, hoc 
est naturaliter attingibile adaequatum intellectui nostro, etsi pro statu isto sit quiditas rei materialis, 
vel forte adhuc specialius, quiditas rei sensibilis, intelligendo non de sensibili proprie solum, sed 
etiam de incluso essentialiter, vel virtualiter in sensibili ». 
78 Cf. e.g. Ord. I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Vat. III, p. 77, n. 124 ; Quaest. quodl., q. 14, ed. Vivès XXVI, 
p. 47b, n. 13.
79 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, ed. Vat. III, p. 323, n. 541 : « Intellectus ergo possibilis, secundum 
quod est illud in quo recipitur forma intelligibilis vel intellectio, vel illud secundum quod species 
recipitur in anima, non erit purum potentiale, sed erit aliquid in actu primo ».
80 Ibid., q. 1, pp. 221-222, n. 365 : « universalius numquam apprehenditur secundum suam 
indifferentiam totam, quando apprehenditur in suo inferiore. Tota enim indifferentia universalioris est 
secundum quod ipsum, ut conceptum, est idem cuilibet suo inferiori ; numquam autem communius 
ut conceptum in inferiore aliquo, est idem inferiori cuilibet, sed praecise illi in quo concipitur ; ergo 
quodcumque universale conceptum in singulari, vel communius in minus communi, non concipitur 
secundum totam indifferentiam suam : potest autem intellectus concipere illud secundum totam 
indifferentiam suam, igitur non concipitur praecise communius in minus communi vel universale 
in singulari, — et ita non praecise universale in phantasmate. Phantasma enim non est proprie nisi 
ipsius singularis, et hoc in quantum est singulare speciei specialissimae » ; ibid., adnotatio interpolata, 
Appendix A, p. 363, n. 221,17 : « Universalius secundum totam indifferentiam suam non potest intelligi 
nec repraesentari in repraesentativo minus universalis ; sed species phantastica est per se et primo 
repraesentativa individui ut est hoc ; igitur in eo non potest repraesentari universale secundum totam 
indifferentiam quam habet ad sua individua omnia ».
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impossibile to obtain the universal concept human being in its total indifference 
by abstraction from its inferiors. Scotus seems to think that it is impossibile to 
obtain a universal concept in its total indifference from a less universal concept. 
In this case, it is only possible to obtain a concept that is common to a series of 
human beings, not including all the other human beings. By speaking in this way, 
Scotus wants to provide the human intellect with a real operation completely 
detached from sensible knowledge, for Scotus claims that the human intellect is 
able to conceive a universal concept in its total indifference (secundum totam suam 
indifferentiam)81. This indifference refers to the capacity of a universal concept 
of being identically present in any other less universal concept82.
Nevertheless, being considered as the first object of the human intellect is not 
a product of a psychological abstraction. When Scotus uses the expression ‘ens 
secundum totam indifferentiam’, he refers to the first object of the human intellect 
as cognized by the intellectual faculty. But, as seen above, the human intellect is 
naturally oriented toward being taken in its greatest extension and the first object 
of the intellect is said to precede any cognitive operation. As noted, in Scotus’s 
texts there is a sense of the term ‘separated’ (abstractum) that is different from 
the meaning associated to the psychological operation of abstraction. Being as 
the first object of the intellect is the principle that activates the intellect ; for this 
reason it cannot be caused by the cognitive relation it comes to entertain with 
the intellect. As illustrated when discussing above the Reportata Parisiensia, II, 
d. 24, being is called ‘separated’, but not because it is produced through an act 
of psychological abstraction. 
2.4. Habitus, Memoria and the First Object of the Human Intellect
In order to understand better Scotus’s position about the first object of the intellect, 
it is necessary also to consider what kind of connection exists between the intellect 
and the intellectual habit (habitus) or science, on the one hand, and their first and 
adequate objects, on the other hand83. Until now we have considered the specific 
characteristics of the first object of the intellect and the relation of this object with 
the human intellect. But the intellect is a cognitive faculty related with the habit of 
science, which includes logic, physics, metaphysics and theology. In this context, the 
habit must be understood as a disposition to every scientific knowledge and not as 
the combination of the many pieces of knowledge possessed by a particular man84.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid. : « numquam cognoscitur magis universale secundum totam indifferentiam suam nisi 
quando cognoscitur ut unum cognoscibile, idem omnibus suis inferioribus ».
83 Cf. r. HofmeiSter PicH, Der Begriff der Wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns 
Scotus (Ph. D. thesis), Bonn 2001.
84 For this distinction, see e.g. Met., V, 20, 1022b4-14.
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According to Scotus, the habit is an essential perfection of the soul and is also 
the first act or form of the intellect. On the contrary, the second act of the intellect 
is an accidental perfection and consists in the single act of knowing85. Like the 
first object of the intellect, the first object of the habit must be adequate to the 
capacity of the habit. Thus, the fundamental characteristic of the first object of 
the habit is to be what first and virtually contains in itself all the truths of the 
habit of the science86. Furthermore, Scotus holds that the habit of the science 
is the intelligible species of the first object and « its formally adequate object is 
the quiddity of which it is the species »87. As in the case of the intellect, Scotus 
holds that the first object of the habit has an essence (quidditas). Secondly, the 
intelligible species of the first object is an essence that is cognized with the habit 
of science (habitualiter)88. The intelligible species of the first object of the intellect 
can be considered as the intellectual representation of the first object. But the 
first object by itself is an essence. Moreover, for the object, ‘to contain virtually’ 
is a capacity independent of another object or a particular intellect89. As Scotus 
writes, the first object of the habit contains every truth thanks only to its nature90.
In the Prologue of the Ordinatio Scotus assumes that the first object of the 
intellect and the first object of a science are one and the same, and he does so 
by discussing the relation that the habit of the science entertains with memory. 
85 Cf. e.g. Quaest. super Met., I, prol., OPh. III, pp. 5-6, n. 8 : « Sicut est duplex actus, primus 
et secundus, ut patet ex II De anima, ita est duplex perfectio, prima et secunda : prima est forma 
vel habitus, secunda est operatio ; et unumquodque naturaliter appetit utramque perfectionem, 
cum operatio sit finis habitus. Haec ergo propositio ‘unumquodque naturaliter suam perfectionem 
appetit’ concludit propositum tam de scientia, de qua processit prima ratio, quam de intelligere, de 
quo processit secunda. […] potentia dicitur aequivoce de potentia essentiali quae est ad formam, et 
accidentali quae est ad operationem ».
86 Cf. Ord., I, Prol., pars 3, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Vat. I, pp. 96-97, nn. 142-143 : « dico quod ratio primi 
obiecti est continere in se primo virtualiter omnes veritates illius habitus. […] Declaro idem secundo 
sic, quia primitas hic accipitur ex I Posteriorum, ex definitione universalis, secundum quod dicit 
adaequationem ; obiectum non esset adaequatum habitui nisi virtualiter contineret omnia illa ad 
quae consideranda habitus talis inclinat, quia si non, habitus excederet obiectum illud ».
87 Ibid., p. 97, n. 145 : « Ille habitus qui dicitur scientia est species intelligibilis primi obiecti. 
Ille respicit veritates immediatas et mediatas, non formaliter sed ex consequenti, et suum obiectum 
adaequatum formaliter est quiditas cuius est species ». According to Scotus, the habit is always an 
intelligible species and can be described as a dispositional cognition. On this, see croSS, Duns Scotus’s 
Theory of Cognition, pp. 90-95.
88 Ibid., pp. 96-97, nn. 142-143.
89 Ibid., p. 97, n. 144 : « Expono quod dixi ‘primo virtualiter’, quia illud est primum quod non 
dependet ab alio sed alia ab ipso ; ita igitur ‘primo continere’ est non dependere ab aliis in continendo 
sed alia ab ipso, hoc est, quod, per impossibile, circumscripto omni alio in ratione obiecti, manente 
intellectu eius, adhuc contineret obiective ».
90 Ibid. : « nihil aliud autem continet nisi per rationem eius ».
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According to Scotus, this proposition : ‘What is known with the habit of science 
(habitualiter), for example A, contains virtually the actual knowledge of B’ is 
equivalent to this statement : ‘The intelligible species of A in memory is able to 
generate the knowledge of B’. Following this idea, ‘to know habitually’ signifies ‘to 
be present in memory’. If we consider the first object of the intellect, we can say 
that being habitually known contains virtually every other knowledge and is able 
to generate every other knowledge. But what is able to generate every particular 
knowledge is also the first object of the intellect. Therefore, the first object of the 
habit and the first object of the intellect are one and the same object91.
We must also stress the equivalence assumed by Scotus between the presence 
of the intelligible species in memory and the habitual cognition92. In line with 
augustine’s De Trinitate, the first two perfections of the human soul are taken to 
be memory (memoria) and knowledge (intelligentia). The former consists in a first 
act with respect to the knowledge that is generated (notitia genita), while the latter 
is a second act whereby the intellect can receive the knowledge that is generated93. 
Now, according to Scotus, the soul has a first total act (actus primus totalis) which 
precedes the act of knowledge. This first total act is a synthesis of something that 
is proper to the soul (aliquid animae) and of the object that is present to the soul 
under its intelligible being (in ratione intelligibilis)94. The former is the faculty of 
the intellect, while the latter, as said above, is the habit of the science, that is, 
the intelligible species of the first object95 and, then, of the every other particular 
object. Scotus calls this synthesis “perfect memory” (perfecta memoria).
In Scotus’s epistemology, the intelligible species of the object is an accidental 
form added to the possible intellect, which is something in first actuality, although 
this actuality is different from the actuality of the agent intellect. The actuality 
91 Ibid., p. 97, n. 145 : « Immo idem est speciem intelligibilem a continere virtualiter notitiam b, 
et ipsum a ut cognitum habitualiter, continere, quod est, speciem intelligibilem ipsius a in memoria 
posse gignere notitiam b in intelligentia. Secundum hoc igitur idem est obiectum primum intellectus 
et scientiae ».
92 On the role of memory in Duns Scotus’s theory of knowledge, see De liBera, La querelle des 
universaux, pp. 324-329 ; Pizzo, Intellectus und memoria nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus ; 
BoulnoiS, Être et representation, pp. 98-122.
93 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, ed. Vat. III, p. 343, n. 580 : « Anima habet in se aliquam perfectionem 
secundum quam est actus primus respectu notitiae genitae, et habet in se perfectionem aliquam 
secundum quam formaliter recipit notitiam genitam, et habet in se aliquam perfectionem secundum 
quam formaliter recipit volitionem. Istae tres perfectiones dicuntur ‘memoria’, ‘intelligentia’ et 
‘voluntas’, — vel ‘anima’ in quantum habet ipsas ».
94 Ibid. : « Anima ergo in quantum habens actum primum totalem respectu intellectionis — aliquid 
scilicet animae et obiectum sibi praesens in ratione ‘intelligibilis’ — dicitur ‘memoria’, et hoc ‘memoria 
perfecta’, includendo tam intellectum quam illud quo obiectum est sibi praesens ».
95 See above, note 85.
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of the possible intellect only consists in its ability to receive actual knowledge96. 
Nevertheless, as explained above, the habit, considered as the intelligible species 
of the first object of the intellect, is an essential form which makes an ontological 
synthesis with the possible intellect, called ‘memory’ or ‘habitual knowledge’ 
(cognitio habitualis). All that leads Scotus to hold that the human soul is 
ontologically composed of the intelligible species (or habit or form) of the first 
object of the intellect and the possible intellect.
According to Scotus, for a thing, being present to the intellect amounts to being 
in the intellect according to an objective modality of existence (esse in intellectu 
obiective)97. By such terms as praesentialiter, praesentia and praesentialitas Scotus 
indicates the relationship holding between the knower and the thing known, 
between the subject and the object98. The object known is present to the intellect, 
but since being is not produced by an act of knowledge, it is originally present to 
the intellect and its praesentialitas coincides with the habit of science. Now, for 
Scotus, presence and universality of the object are two necessary conditions for 
actual knowledge. This is the reason why Scotus maintains that there is always 
an intelligible species in the memory which precedes any act of cognizing (actus 
intelligendi) and represents the universal in actuality as universal99.
96 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, ed. Vat. III, p. 322, n. 541 : « intellectio autem sive species intelligibilis 
non est forma substantialis, sed accidens : ergo quod est immediate receptivum illius, est aliquid in 
actu substantiali, aut saltem quod est mediate receptivum, — et tunc quod immediate recipit erit 
aliquis actus accidentalis, sicut se habet superficies ad albedinem. Intellectus ergo possibilis, secundum 
quod est illud in quo recipitur forma intelligibilis vel intellectio, vel illud secundum quod species 
recipitur in anima, non erit purum potentiale, sed erit aliquid in actu primo, licet ipse respectus 
potentiae non sit aliquid in actu ».
97 Cf. Rep. Par., prol., q. 1, art. 2, ed. Vivès XXII, p. 13, n. 11 : « Nihil potest esse in intellectu 
obiective nisi vel obiciatur intellectui praesentialiter in se ipso vel in aliquo repraesentativo eius 
realiter existente ». See J. BiarD, Intention et présence : la notion de presentialitas au XIVe siècle, in D. 
Perler ed., Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, Brill, Leiden 2001, pp. 265-282. See also, 
o. BoulnoiS, Être, luire et concevoir. Notes sur la genèse et la structure de la conception scotiste de l’esse 
objective, « Collectanea Franciscana », 60/1-2, 1990, pp. 117-135 ; iD., La présence chez Duns Scot, in 
l. Sileo ed., Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, Atti del Congresso Scotistico 
Internazionale, Roma 9-11 marzo 1993, Antonianum, Roma 1995, pp. 95-119.
98 See Ord., I, pars 3, q. 1, ed. Vat. III, p. 232, n. 382 ; ibid., adnotatio interpolata, Appendix A, p. 
366, n. 232, 19.
99 Ibid., I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1, p. 225, n. 370 : « Ad quaestionem dico quod necesse est ponere 
in intellectu ut habet rationem memoriae, speciem intelligibilem repraesentantem universale ut 
universale, priorem naturaliter actu intelligendi, — propter istas rationes iam positas ex parte obiecti, 
in quantum universale et in quantum praesens intellectui : quae duae condiciones, scilicet universalitas 
et praesentia, praecedunt naturaliter intellectionem ». See also ibid., p. 217, n. 359 : « universale 
autem in actu praecedit actum intelligendi [...], quia obiectum sub ratione obiecti praecedit actum ».
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Scotus at times refers to being as to a universal concept100. In Scotus’s doctrine 
there are three kinds of universal : the second intention, which indicates a 
relation of reason that obtains between the universal predicable and the subject 
of predication ; the first intention considered as indifferent and opposed both to 
universality and to singularity ; the first intention considered as an intelligible 
object that is predicable of many things. The third kind is what Scotus calls the 
universal in the proper and complete sense (complete universale), what is included 
essentially (quidditative) in every inferior. It precedes the second intention and 
is indeterminate, although not opposed contradictorily to the possibility of 
predication101. As seen above, the first object of the human intellect is universal 
in this third sense. According to Scotus, the universal in the proper and complete 
sense exists in the intellect in an objective way. Moreover, this kind of universal 
is known in the habit and not by an act of intellection102.
Scotus points out that the universal in the proper and complete sense is 
abstracted by the active intellect but, as demonstrated above, being as the first 
object of the intellect is not a product of human abstraction. This entails that 
being must be considered as a sui generis universal. It precedes every single 
act of knowing because it is an essential constituent of the first act of the soul, 
specifically of memory or habit.
In De Trinitate, Augustine called memory « a certain kind of mysterious 
knowledge (arcana quadam notitia) »103. I think that Scotus’s notion of the habit 
as the intelligible species of being is a mysterious knowledge and is very close 
to Augustine’s conception of memory. Following Augustine, Scotus holds that 
100 See e.g. Quaest. super De an., q. 16, OPh. V, pp. 150-151, n. 18 ; Quaest. super Met., IV, q. 1, 
OPh. III, p. 51, n. 308. 
101 Quaest. super Met., VII, q. 18, OPh. IV, p. 347, nn. 38-41 : « Circa huius quaestionis solutionem, 
primo distinguendum est de universali. Sumitur enim vel sumi potest tripliciter : Quandoque pro 
intentione secunda, quae scilicet est quaedam relatio rationis in praedicabili ad illud de quo est 
praedicabile, et hunc respectum significat hoc nomen ‘universale’ in concreto, sicut et ‘universalitas’ in 
abstracto. Alio modo accipitur universale pro illo quod denominatur ab ista intentione, quod est aliqua 
res primae intentionis, nam secundae intentiones applicantur primis. Et sic accipi potest dupliciter : uno 
modo pro illo quod quasi subiectum remotum denominatur ab ista intentione ; alio modo pro subiecto 
propinquo. Primo modo dicitur natura absolute sumpta universale, quia non est ex se haec, et ita non 
repugnat sibi ex se dici de multis. Secundo modo non est universale nisi sit actu indeterminatum, 
ita quod unum intelligibile numero sit dicibile de omni supposito, et illud est complete universale ».
102 Ibid., adnotatio interpolata, p. 350, n. 45 : « tertium est universale dictum contrarie, et illud 
est universale completum, abstractum per intellectum a determinatione. Et dicitur contrarie ad 
differentiam naturae ut determinatae ad singularitatem, quae dicitur ut sic privative universale 
quia est apta nata fieri universale sive indeterminate in actu. Istud tertium universale habet esse in 
intellectu obiective et non necessario subiective. Obiective, inquam, non actu sed habitu, vel non 
actu secundo necessario, sed actu primo ».
103 Cf. auguStinuS HiPPonienSiS, De Trinitate, XIV, VI, 8.
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memory, intellect, will and their acts are images of God104. But, as seen above, 
memory and intellect are constituted by the presence of their first object, that 
is, being. Now, according to Scotus, God is the « ratio of the first object of the 
intellect, namely being (ens), and this in the highest degree »105. Here the Latin 
term ‘ratio’ should be understood as ‘fulfillment’ of the first object of the human 
intellect. However, the first object of the intellect is different from God.
2.5 Being and the Three Orders of Primacy
Until this point, we have considered being from two different points of view : 
being as the first object of the intellect and being as a concept produced by the 
intellectual activity. The former can be considered abstract because it does not 
coincide with any particular being and any particular intellect. Being as the first 
object precedes and lays the basis for any intellectual activity. In this sense, being 
is the most adequate object of the human intellect, because it satisfies the capacity 
of the intellect in via and makes possible the beatific vision. Being as the first object 
is present in memory as an habitual, not as an actual cognition. On the contrary, 
being as a concept produced by the intellectual activity, that is, being in its total 
indifference, is a universal concept indifferent to every form of determination and 
obtained through an act of psychological abstraction. Such a concept represents being 
as cognized by the human intellect, so it necessarily follows the intellect’s activity. 
On account of this, from a temporal point of view, being in its total indifference 
cannot be the first concept understood in actuality by the human intellect.
If our interpretation is correct, we can say that being is not always the first object 
of the intellect in every order of primacy. Scotus has paid attention to clarifying 
this topic in order to prevent some possible misunderstandings. Specifically, 
Scotus distinguishes three orders of primacy in the field of what is intelligible : 
1) origin or generation ; 2) perfection ; 3) adequation.
The first cognized in actuality in order of origin or generation is the lowest species 
which cannot be further specified (species specialissima), although it is cognized in 
a confuse way. In fact, the first known in a distinct way in order of origin is being 
because it is an absolutely simple concept (conceptus simpliciter simplex) and every 
inferior concept cannot be known without the concept of being106. But, in order of 
104 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, ed. Vat. II, pp. 344-345, n. 583. See also auguStinuS HiPPonienSiS, 
De Trinitate, X, X-XII.
105 Cf. Ord., I, d. 2, pars 1, q. 1-2, ed. Vat. II, pp. 209-210, n. 138 : « in tali cogitabili [Deo] summe 
quiescit intellectus ; ergo in ipso est ratio primi obiecti intellectus, scilicet entis, et hoc in summo ».
106 Ibid., pp. 54-55, n. 80. An absolutely simple concept is not composed of other more simple 
concepts. See ibid., I, d. 3, q. 2, a 6, ed. Vat. III, p. 336, n. 21 : « Conceptum simpliciter simplicem 
voco, qui non est resolubilis in plures conceptus, ut conceptus entis vel ultimae differenttiae ».
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origin, there is also a habitual and virtual cognition. What is habitually cognized 
is present inside the intellect in an intelligible manner in such a way that the 
intellect can generate an immediate act of knowledge about it. What is virtually 
cognized, instead, is included in what is cognized in actuality, but not as the proper 
term of the intellection. For example, when the concept man is known, also the 
concept animal is virtually known because it is a part of the concept man107. We 
must remember here that being is what virtually includes every other cognition, 
but it is also important to stress that, according to Scotus, the first habitually and 
virtually cognized in order of origin is what is most common, that is, being108.
The first known in order of absolute perfection (ordo perfectionis simpliciter) 
is God, but what is sensible is more perfect proportionally (ordo perfectionis 
secundum proportionem) to the human intellect109.
Finally, the first cognized in order of adequation is being, as we have explained 
in this article.
Following these distinctions, we can say that being is the first because : 1) it 
is distinctly cognized in actuality because of its simplicity ; 2) it is habitually and 
virtually cognized because its intelligible species and the habit are the same thing 
and it virtually includes every inferior cognition ; 3) finally, being is the first concept 
in order of adequation because it is equivalent to the extension of the intellect.
In conclusion, by considering being in common to God and creature, substance 
and accident, first intention and second intention, as the first and actually only 
necessary condition for knowledge and science, Scotus gives to his epistemology a 
solid philosophical ground. As has been shown by many scholars, Scotus reaches 
this result by rejecting the interpretations of such influent thinkers as Thomas 
Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, and of some theologians of the Franciscan tradition, 
like Bonaventure.
3. concluSion
Scotus’s texts show a shift in his doctrine on the relationship between being and 
the human intellect. We pointed out that the focus on univocal being that is the 
107 Ibid., p. 60, n. 92 : « ‘Habitualem’ voco quando obiectum sic est praesens intellectui in ratione 
intelligibilis actu, ut intellectus possit statim habere actum elicitum circa illud. — ‘Virtualem’ voco 
quando aliquid intelligitur in aliquo ut pars intellecti primi, non autem ut primum intellectum, sicut 
cum intelligitur ‘homo’, intelligitur ‘animal’ in homine ut pars intellectum, non autem ut primum 
intellectum sive ut totale, terminans intellectionem. Hoc satis proprie vocatur ‘intellectum virtualiter’, 
quia est satis proximum intellecto actu : non enim posset esse actualius intellectum nisi esset propria 
intellectione intellectum, quae esset ipsius ut primi et totalis termini ».
108 Ibid., p. 60, n. 93.
109 Ibid., pp. 62-63, nn. 95-98.
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hallmark of the Ordinatio is rejected in later works like the Reportata Parisiensia 
and the Quaestiones quolibetales. Scotus gives up speaking about being as an 
univocal concept and refers to being as what comes before any possible knowledge. 
The possibility of being concerns both the metaphysical level and the logical one.
Scotus underscores the formal background of predication in which the ratio 
entis is formally convertible with intelligibility. In this way, the expression ratio 
entis acquires a sort of indifference compared to the metaphysical and the 
logical meaning of being, that is, to its division into being in the soul and being 
outside the soul. This formal background of every particular science shows that 
being is an exception when compared with others essences or concepts110. Being 
is evident in itself due to its simplicity111. But being is also the condition of 
possibility for human thought. For this reason, being is the form and the object 
of human intellect112. Olivier Boulnois has noticed that, according to Scotus, « la 
noétique fonde la structure transcendantale de la métaphysique » and « l’articulation 
transcendantale de la métaphysique repose, d’une manière analogue à celle de 
Kant, sur un fondement critique »113. But it is important to make it clear that, for 
Scotus, being cannot be explained as a sort of rationalistic a priori or Kantian 
110 After Scotus, some authors will notice this peculiarity. Francis of Marchia, for example, will 
talk about being as a ‘neutral intention’ (intencio neutra). Cf. franciScuS De marcHia, Quodlibet, q. 3, ed. 
N. mariani, Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, Grottaferrata 1997, p. 71 : « quedam 
vero, sunt neutre : neque prime, neque secunde, sed communes ad utramque sicut est forte intencio 
entis, que includitur formaliter in utraque intencione tam prima quam secunda ». On this, see also 
S. folger-fonfara, Das ‘super’-transzendentale Und Die Spaltung Der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf Des 
Franziskus Von Marchia, Brill, Leiden 2008, ch. 1.
111 Cf. Ord., I, d. 3, pars I, qq. 1-2, ed. Vat. III, pp. 91-92, n. 147 : « De prima ostenditur, quia aut 
intellectus est certus de aliquo tali quod sit ens, dubitando utrum sit hoc vel illud, tamen non est 
certus quod sit ens quiditative, sed quasi praedicatione ‘per accidens’ ; vel aliter, et melius : quilibet 
talis conceptus est simpliciter simplex, et ideo non potest secundum aliquid concipi et secundum 
aliquid ignorari, — sicut patet per Philosophum IX Metaphysicae, in fine, de conceptibus simpliciter 
simplicibus, quod non est circa eos deceptio, sicut est circa quiditatem complexorum, — quod non 
est intelligendum quasi intellectus simplex formaliter decipiatur circa intellectionem quiditatis, quia 
in intellectione simplici non est verum vel falsum. Sed circa quiditatem compositam potest intellectus 
simplex virtualiter decipi : si enim ista ratio est in se falsa, tunc includit virtualiter propositionem falsam. 
Quod autem est simpliciter simplex, non includit virtualiter, proximo, nec formaliter propositionem 
falsam, et ideo circa ipsum non est deceptio : vel enim totaliter attingitur, vel non attingitur, et tunc 
omnino ignoratur. De nullo ergo simpliciter simplici conceptu potest esse certitudo secundum 
aliquid eius, et dubitatio secundum aliud » ; Qq. De anima, q. 16, ed. cit., pp. 150-151, n. 18 : « Prius 
distincte illud cognoscitur quod intrat definitionem alterius, per quod aliud distincte cognoscitur ; 
sed ens quod est universalissimum intrat definitionem omnium, cum conceptus entis includatur in 
conceptu cuiuslibet — ipsum autem non habet conceptum nisi distinctum, quia non habet in quo 
possit confuse et indistincte conosci ; igitur, etc. ».
112 On this topic, see BoulnoiS, Être et representation, pp. 100-101.
113 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
gian pietro soliani398
function of judgment114. Thanks to its original presence in the soul, being is better 
understood as a form in the Aristotelian sense. Being provides the human intellect 
with the horizon of knowledge, in virtue of its indeterminate praesentialitas which 
can subsequently be determined by particular acts of intellection. We can also 
say that being as the first object of the intellect expresses a unity of praesentialitas 
whereby every being can be present and then become an object for the intellect.
114 See Soliani, Rosmini e Duns Scoto.
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Duns Scotus on the First Object of the Human Intellect. From the ens univocum to the 
ens possibile
This article riconsiders the evolution of Scotus’s position about the first and most 
adequate object of the human intellect in some of Scotus’s works. I also try to demonstrate 
that only Scotus’s last solution to the problem of the first and most adequate object of 
human intellect is coherent with his epistemology. This solution represents a point of 
departure from Avicenna’s thought and shows the decreasing importance of the univocity 
of being in the characterization of the first and most adequate object of the human intellect. 
Finally, I point out that being as the first and adequate object of the human intellect is not 
a product of a psychological abstraction, but it is present originally in the human memory 
and intellect as the condition of possibility for human knowledge and science.
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